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and provide unique insight into the complexity of the issue. This decision was the driving force behind the
formation of the White House Plumbers, the group that orchestrated one of the most infamous political
scandals and the eventual implosion of Nixon’s career. It also effectively changed the tide of the Vietnam War,
contributed to the credibility gap, and forever modified the relationship between the press and the federal
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Introduction
The Vietnam War
Since its inception, ambition and altruism has shaped and altered the course of United
States history. As a fledgling nation, America pursued expansionist and idealistic goals, seeking
to build power and influence, usually at the expense of weaker international states. The
American self-perception was that it was the country’s responsibility to spread their democratic
ideals with the rest of the world (Anderson and Ernst 2007, 16). This mission, coupled with a
sense of survival of the fittest, led to an assertive, yet ambiguous, national role in international
relations (Anderson and Ernst 2007, 16). This perspective is evident throughout the course of
American history, from World War II to the current War on Terror. However, the United States
has not always been successful in its international endeavors, as evidenced in the Vietnam War
where the nation experienced the very limits of its power and righteousness (Anderson and Ernst
2007, 16).
The official rationale for America’s intervention in the affairs of Vietnam was the
significance Vietnam held in regards to the global Cold War that pitted the United States’
interests and ideology against that of the Soviet Union (Anderson and Ernst 2007, 16). Due to
numerous factors—including the increasingly dangerous Cold War in Europe, the successes of
the Chinese Communist Party, and attacks on U.S. naval destroyers by North Vietnam—
Washington was led to direct involvement in the Indochina conflict with the 1964 Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution (Anderson and Ernst 2007, 17; Berinsky 2009, 18). In the early 1960s and the
beginning of warfare in Vietnam, the general consensus of American citizens was that it was the
duty of the United States to contain Communist political power wherever it materialized
(Anderson and Ernst 2007, 17). However, as the years wore on, public opinion began to decline
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as the nation became further embroiled in the conflict (Berinsky 2009, 18). This steady trend
downward was punctuated by three key turning points; prominent amongst them was the year
1971 (Berinsky 2009, 20). The year 1971 is significant because on June 13, the New York Times
released the first installment in a series later referred to as the Pentagon Papers that would
eventually change the course of United States history (U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration, 2011).
The Pentagon Papers
The atmosphere of the nation during the late 1960s and early 1970s was fraught with the
intensity of combat in Vietnam, such as fighting in the demilitarized zone that separated North
and South Vietnam, bombing raids in northern Laos, as well as the increasing revelation of shady
governmental misconduct, such as the exposure of secret CIA bases (Prados and Porter 2004, 12). By 1968, citizens were clamoring for the nation to pull out of Vietnam, and yet three years
later, the United States was still as deeply entrenched as before (Prados and Porter 2004, 3). The
country witnessed President Nixon’s power become absolute through the widespread
manipulation of information to the point where it was unclear where the lies ended and reality
began (Prados and Porter 2004, 2). Driven by these fears and vocal protests from the public,
legislative leaders attempted to halt the reach of the Executive Branch by voting to repeal the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution and offering bills, riders, and amendments with the aim of restricting
Nixon’s power. However, despite these efforts, Nixon still vowed that he would continue
military efforts in Vietnam. The nation was in an uproar and it was during this immense
controversy that the Pentagon Papers were “dropped like a huge stink bomb,” (Prados and Porter
2004, 2).
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On June 13, 1971, the front page of the New York Times read “Vietnam Archive:
Pentagon Study Traces Three Decades of Growing U.S. Involvement,” the first installment of
what was to become a major series based upon a massive, top-secret study compiled by the
Pentagon (Prados and Porter 2004, 1). It catalogued the innermost thoughts of Presidential
administrations during crucial points of the war, from Harry S. Truman to Lyndon Johnson, and
provided an inside account of the government’s choices on the Vietnam War. Over 7,000 pages
long, the study investigated political-military involvement in Vietnam from 1945-1967 with the
use of documents the government had considered classified (Prados and Porter 2004, 51).
Suddenly the hidden intentions of American policymakers were revealed to the general public
and a stark contrast emerged between what Americans had been told regarding the war and what
was actually occurring (Prados and Porter 2004, 3). The Pentagon Papers demonstrated a
consistent, systematic deception by the American government (Prados and Porter 2004, 54). The
study also revealed that the United States had secretly expanded the war in Indochina with the
bombings of Cambodia and Laos, Marine Corps attacks, and coastal raids on North Vietnam,
none of which had been reported on by the mainstream media (Prados and Porter 2004, 52).
The Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, had originally commissioned the Vietnam
Study Task Force on June 17, 1967 with the intent of compiling an in-depth history of America’s
every action in the Vietnam War, the study the New York Times would later use (Prados and
Porter 2004, 12). Thirty-six analysts worked on the project under direction from Assistant
Secretary of Defense John McNaughton and then Leslie Gelb, a Defense Department official,
following the death of McNaughton (Prados and Porter 2004, 14-20). One such analyst was
Daniel Ellsberg, who was later responsible for the publishing of the study (Prados and Porter
2004, 51). Appalled by the government’s systematic public lies about the war, Ellsberg originally
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appealed to National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger about the study and Kissinger’s ability
to learn from the findings in order to better lead the country (Prados and Porter 2004, 51).
Kissinger refused to listen to Ellsberg, and believing that he had no other recourse available to
him to help the American people, Ellsberg turned to the media (Prados and Porter 2004, 51).
Ellsberg leaked the secret documents to the New York Times and the Washington Post
who then labored for several months to pare the material down to a manageable amount to be
released (Prados and Porter 2004, 60). Nixon originally was not too concerned with the
publication because the findings mostly embarrassed the Johnson and Kennedy administrations
(Prados and Porter 2004, 78). However, Kissinger convinced the president that it would be
remiss not to oppose the publication because it would establish a negative precedent for future
state secrets and urged Nixon to prosecute Ellsberg under the Espionage Act of 1917 (Prados and
Porter 2004, 79). Kissinger also persuaded Nixon to implore to the New York Times and
Washington Post to voluntarily cease publication of the series (Prados and Porter 2004, 78).
When the newspapers refused to comply, the federal government initiated legal action that would
later become one of the most important First Amendment decisions in American legal history.
New York Times CO. v. United States (1971)
On April 8, 1736, Benjamin Franklin wrote, “Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a
free government; when this support is taken away the constitution of a free society is dissolved,
and tyranny is erected on its ruins.” This statement is significant in that it demonstrates how
highly the Founding Fathers valued the press as a safeguard of democracy and integral to
combating tyranny. In the case of the Pentagon Papers, the government sought an injunction
against the publication by the New York Times and the Washington Post of the remaining
contents of the classified study that exposed presidential misconduct and in so doing, violated the
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very nature of Franklin’s principle (New York Times v. U.S. 1971). President Nixon argued that
governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual expression, otherwise known
as prior restraint, was legal in this case to protect national security and continuing war efforts
(Garner 2009, 1314). However, the lower courts did not see the issue as such. Each District
Court denied injunctive relief on this basis and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the judgment while the Second Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court in
New York for further hearings. The Supreme Court granted certiorari almost immediately due to
the case’s high-profile nature and implications for the Executive Branch. The Supreme Court
addressed the issues at hand in a per curiam opinion. Directly translated as “by the court,” 1 the
per curiam opinion in New York Times v. U.S. examined the role of the executive branch and its
power (or lack thereof) in limiting the freedom of the press, an issue that has plagued the
government since its inception.
The First Amendment of the Constitution stipulates:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. (Emphasis added).
Traditionally the Court has ruled in favor of the press on issues of prior restraints of expression.
As Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan (1963) held, “any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Another key
Supreme Court case focusing on this First Amendment issue was Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe (1971) in which the Court said that the government “thus carries a heavy burden
of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.” Relying on these two major
1

Per curiam opinions concurrently grants certiorari and disposes of the virtues while discussing
both the issues and the facts involved without identifying the individual judge who penned the
decision (Garner 2009, 1201).
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precedents, as well as Near v. Minnesota (1931), in a six to three decision, the Court found that
in the case of the New York Times v. U.S., the federal government did not meet the burden of
proof required for prior restraint and therefore could not censor the New York Times or the
Washington Post. As such, they affirmed the ruling of Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit and reversed the order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
remanded it with the instructions to enter a judgment affirming that of the Southern District
Court of New York. To accompany this decision, six Justices penned concurring decisions and
three wrote dissenting ones.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, authored the first concurring opinion. Black
argues that as stated under the First Amendment, the press must be left free to publish news—
regardless the source—without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints. He believes that the
guarding of diplomatic and military secrets at the expense of informed representative
government is not justified and asserts that to hold any other way would “make a shambles of the
First Amendment.” Justice Black argues that this is the “first time in the 182 years since the
founding of the Republic, the federal courts are asked to hold that the First Amendment does not
mean what it says,” and is pressured to succumb to the will of the federal government. To act in
such a manner, Black believes, would be to eradicate the “essential purpose and history of the
First Amendment” and “destroy the fundamental liberty and security of the very people the
government hopes to make secure.” He believes that “security” should not be used to “abrogate
the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.” Black relies heavily on the writings of
the Founding Fathers, asserting that the only way to effectively expose deception in the
government and sustain democracy is through a free and unrestrained press. In Black’s opinion,
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the New York Times and the Washington Post should be commended for their valor rather than
vilified.
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black joins, wrote the second concurrence. Douglas
stated that the First Amendment leaves no room for governmental restraint on the press and it
was created with the dominant purpose to prohibit the governmental suppression of embarrassing
information. Douglas also asserts that there is no statute enacted by Congress that would bar the
publication of the Pentagon Papers by the press. He addresses the government’s argument that
the newspapers’ actions were barred under the Espionage Act of 1917 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) in
saying that Congress was capable of distinguishing between the publication of material and
communication of that same information and the fact that they did not include it is a clear
indication that their argument is invalid and therefore the New York Times and Washington Post
are not liable. Relying on Near v. Minnesota, Douglas also repudiates the government’s
argument that its inherent powers allows them to go to court and obtain an injunction to protect
the national interest. He deems this as unsound because Near prohibited it “in no uncertain
terms.” Notably, Douglas states, “secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic.”
Justice Brennan, the third Justice to concur, held that the First Amendment stood as an
absolute bar to the imposition of judicial restraints in circumstances of the kind presented in New
York Times v. U.S. He reasoned that since the publication of the materials would not cause a
direct, inevitable, and immediate event that would jeopardize the safety of Americans, prior
restraint was not applicable.
Justice Stewart was the fourth Justice to file a concurring opinion and Justice White
joined him. Stewart argues that as constructed in the Constitution, the Executive branch is
endowed with enormous power in regards to national defense and international relations and as
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such, has the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve “the degree of internal security
necessary to exercise that power successfully.” However, he stipulates that in order to regulate
this unchecked executive power, it is crucial to have an enlightened citizenry, which is ultimately
dependent on a free press. Justice Stewart reasons that in order to maintain wisdom, it would
make the most sense to insist upon the avoidance of secrecy since “when everything is classified,
then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded…or manipulated…”
Stewart also maintains that although the Executive Branch is at the forefront of international
relations, Congress and the Judicial branch have input by creating the laws and then applying
them. As such, he finds that disclosure of the documents will not result in direct, immediate, or
irreparable damage to America and therefore there is no standing for prior restraint.
Justice White concurs 2 in a similar vein as Stewart, acknowledging the Executive’s role
in international affairs but also addressing the fact that because of precedent, the burden of proof
is extremely heavy on the government in prior restraint cases. He sustains that although the
government is right in arguing that some of the documents will be detrimental to national
security if released, some have already been published, subsequently setting this potential
destruction in motion. White believes that had the government instead prosecuted the case under
the Espionage Act, it is quite reasonable to imagine that they would have been successful in
accruing criminal charges and the Court would then have no difficulty in justifying the
imposition of a prior restraint. But White perceived that as the case stood currently, the
injunction was not relevant based on the government’s arguments.
Justice Marshall penned the last of the concurring decisions regarding New York Times v.
U.S. In it he wrote that unlike the previous Supreme Court Justices, he believed that the issue at

2

Stewart also joined White’s concurrence.
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hand was not of First Amendment nature, but instead the separation of powers doctrine in that it
begged the question as to whether the Supreme Court has the power to make such a law
prohibiting the publishing of certain material. Marshall believes that in asking for the Court to
provide an injunction, it would require the Court to violate the powers given to each branch of
the government in the Constitution. He cites two previous occasions when Congress has
considered passing legislation that would criminalize the actions of the New York Times and
Washington Post and ultimately decided against it. Marshall states that by asking the Court to
rule on (and effectively bring into law) something that Congress has refused to do so, violates the
powers given to each of the three branches. In order to prove this theory wrong, Marshall argues
that the government would have to demonstrate that there was no applicable statute under
criminal law, therefore justifying their demands of the Court. However, Marshall asserts that
there is a multitude of statutes in this area that is relevant to the case, including mainly the
Espionage Act, invalidating the government’s claims.
Three notable Justices—Justice Harlan, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun—
each filed separate dissents, however, Harlan authored one that was joined by both of the other
dissenters. 3 Harlan adheres to Justice Holmes’ dissent in Northern Securities Co. v. United States
(1904) in which he says, “great cases like hard cases make bad law” in that the Court was
“irresponsibly feverish” in dealing with New York Times v. U.S. Harlan argues that due to the
incredible intricacies and difficult factors present in the case, the Court should have addressed a
multitude of questions that were not even raised to properly rule in this case. He argues that
impacts of New York Times v. U.S. will be enormous and therefore it is the responsibility of the
courts to be diligent and not succumb to the torrent of publicity and sensationalism.
3

Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun’s dissent are extremely similar to that of
Justice Harlan’s and respectively represent two separate parts of Harlan’s argument.
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Overall, Harlan disagrees with the majority as to the fundamental issue at stake. He
perceives, similar to Marshall, that instead of a First Amendment issue, the case addresses the
role of separation of powers. However unlike Marshall, Harlan asserts that the Executive
Branch’s power in the realm of international affairs is unparalleled and that according to Chief
Justice Marshall during his time as a Representative in Congress, “the President is the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,” and should
be respected as such by the Court. However, Harlan does recognize the role the Judicial branch
plays in insulating the Executive’s ultimate power, 4 and allows that the judiciary may insist that
the determination that the disclosure of certain materials would impair national security be
evaluated by the head of that Executive Department concerned, after personal consideration by
that officer. Harlan sees this as a required safeguard in the grey area of executive claims on
privileged secrets of the state. Beyond that, though, Harlan believes that the Judiciary cannot go
farther and “redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security.”
This perspective is in alignment that the “very nature of executive decisions as to foreign
policy is political, not judicial, 5” and should be determined by the two branches that are political
in nature. With this in mind, Harlan recommends that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit Court be vacated and remanded for further proceedings to the
District Court, while diligently ensuring that the Government is given enough time to present
their case. Harlan also advocates for affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

4

It was found in the case of United States v. Reynolds that the Constitution forbids the “complete
abandonment of judicial control” in such First Amendment cases.
5
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp. (1948) 333 U.S. 103.
10

The key factual dispute in the Pentagon Papers case was whether or not the government
had demonstrated that the release of the study, or even a small amount, would threaten sufficient
harm to justify a prior restraint on its release (Bellia 2012). In holding that it did not, the
Supreme Court left the responsibility of weighing the public interest in disclosure against the
projected harm in the hands of the publishers (Bellia 2012). However, it is clear through the
separate opinions that there are divergent views about the constraint on the role of press in
publicly disclosing national security information leaked by another (Bellia 2012).
At one extreme, Justices Black and Douglas left no room for judicial or executive
assessment of national security harm in cases involving leaks (Bellia 2012). On the other end of
the spectrum, Justice Harlan advocated for judicial deference to the executive’s assessment of the
harm the leaked information would cause, effectively foreclosing the possibility that publishers
would have the exclusive say (Bellia 2012). Between these polar opposites, a number of Justices
presumed that the risk of criminal liability and obligations of responsible journalism would affect
the publishers’ approach (Bellia 2012). Despite the differences amongst the separate opinions,
there is one monumental area of common ground: the differing opinions allowed that the
disclosure of national security information depends upon the judgment of the publisher, the
market, journalistic ethics, or by the possibility of criminal liability, and not solely upon the
judgment of the leaker (Bellia 2012).
Significance of New York Times v. U.S.
The legacy of New York Times v. U.S. is one of utmost importance. Instead of serving
solely as a win for the American Press, this monumental decision impacted American society in
ways that the government could never have predicted at its onset. Indeed, its impacts were
experienced across the spectrum of American culture, from politics to culturally, and even
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historically as well. Had the Court decided differently, the whole course of American history
would be different.
Political Impact
In essence, New York Times v. U.S. was a politically motivated case; it was borne from
corrupt government machinations and was controversial because the government tried to censor
it. As such, it would be foolish to imagine that the holding would not have a great significance on
American politics. Indeed, it could be argued that this case was a catalyst for events that were
much larger than the case itself. This is demonstrated by its immediate impact on foreign
relations as well as the eventual implosion of Nixon’s career.
The expressed fears of Nixon and Kissinger (and the supposed basis for prior restraint)
that the study would negatively impact and disrupt diplomatic negotiations with Hanoi, Beijing,
and Moscow never actually came to fruition (Prados and Porter 2004, 183). Instead, the
documents had very little effect on the Executive’s relations with foreign countries. Kissinger
left as planned for China the day following the Supreme Court decision and the only echoes of
the Pentagon Papers affair was within his own entourage (Prados and Porter 2004, 183).
Kissinger himself even admitted, “I do not believe now that publication of the Pentagon Papers
made the final difference in Hanoi’s decision to conclude an agreement in 1971,” (Prados and
Porter 2004, 183). It could even be argued that the study’s publication shortened the American
War in Vietnam, according to Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State in the Carter administration
(Prados and Porter 2004, 183). This revelation of the shady dealings on behalf of the American
government in the Indochina conflict caused an increase in the antiwar movement and pressured
the government to behave in a way that pleased the citizens (Prados and Porter 2004, 184).
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Despite the high level of controversy surrounding the Pentagon Papers, Nixon managed
to emerge from the direct fallout relatively unscathed. Nixon was then up for reelection in 1972,
the year directly following the publishing of the study and won in a landslide victory, rivaling the
greatest of American political history (Broder 1972). However, Nixon’s luck was short-lived,
and facing certain impeachment, Nixon resigned on August 8, 1974 (History.com). Although
many attribute Nixon’s downfall to the Watergate scandal, its seminal cause was in fact the
Pentagon Papers (Krogh 2007).
Two months following the publishing of Pentagon Papers, Nixon gathered together a
special group of men, including former C.I.A. and F.B.I. agents and a member of the National
Security Council for a top-secret meeting regarding a classified assignment (Krogh 2007). This
special team of operatives would come to be called the White House Special Investigations Unit,
otherwise nicknamed the White House “Plumbers.” President Nixon told the crew, that he
viewed the leak as a matter of critical importance to national security and he instructed the
specialized team to find out how the leak had happened and prevent it from occurring again in
the future (Krogh 2007). The Plumbers decided that they would break into the office of Daniel
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist to find out information on his mental state and subsequently discredit him
(Krogh 2007). When Ellsberg and his coconspirator Anthony Russo, were charged under the
Espionage Act of 1917 for their crime in leaking the Pentagon Papers, they faced a maximum
sentence of 115 years (Arnold 1974). However, when the break-in of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist was
revealed, along with the government’s illegal wiretapping of Ellsberg’s telephone conversations,
the judge presiding over the case declared a mistrial (Arnold 1974). He asserted, “the
government’s action in this case offended a sense of justice,” and because of the Plumber’s
actions on behest of Nixon, the two were allowed to go free (Arnold 1974).
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This was the beginning of Nixon’s crooked dealings that eventually led to the Watergate
Scandal and his eventual impeachment (Krogh 2007). As scholars assert, “The Ellsberg-Russo
Pentagon Papers trial is said…to be 66 percent of the reason Nixon fell; Watergate, the other 33
percent—that was stimulated by the Pentagon Papers too,” (Prados and Porter 2004, 188). New
York Times v. U.S. was not only helpful in mobilizing the antiwar movement, but also served as
the root of Nixon’s professional and personal destruction. These political effects also transferred
over to impact the general population, as well as the course of history.
Social Implications
Surprisingly, when the New York Times first printed the Pentagon Papers, it took at least
a day for the full impact of the study to be felt (Prados and Porter 2004, 12). Since it was a
lengthy Sunday edition, most people did not read it at first, including President Nixon (Prados
and Porter 2004, 12). But when it started to receive more attention, it was as if a metaphysical
bomb had gone off and the American people were experiencing the aftereffects. According to
Harvard law professor Charles Nesson, the study’s disclosure “lent credibility to and finally
crystallized the growing consensus that the Vietnam War was wrong and legitimized the radical
critique of the war,” (Prados and Porter 2004, 183). It reinforced the growing anti-war movement
in the country by acknowledging that they were right in regards to the governments’ misconduct
and gave them extraordinary standing in the eyes of the rest of the country and the world. The
revelation of the Pentagon Papers also shattered a spell that held sway in the country that the
people and the government had to always be in agreement on major issues (Prados and Porter
2004, 191). It taught newspapers that they should not take the government blindly on its word in
future instances (Prados and Porter 2004, 191).
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The release of the Pentagon Papers was also instrumental in widening the credibility gap
that existed between the American public and governmental officials. Defined as a situation in
which the things that someone says are not trusted because of the discrepancy between what is
true and what is said, the first documented use of credibility gap is shown in the year 1966 as a
result of the country’s entrance into the Indochina conflict (Merriam-Webster 2013). When the
public learned of this top-secret study that exposed all the lies the government had told them over
the years, it understandably widened this gap further (Prados and Porter 2004, 190). This in turn
helped the antiwar movement and raised awareness regarding the government’s actions.
The events surrounding the Pentagon Papers were also indicative that times were
changing in America. Prior to the controversy, this blatant disregard for the federal government
would have been viewed as un-American and antithetical to what the nation was founded on
(Prados and Porter 2004, 184). Indeed, Ellsberg would have been seen as a traitor by the whole
nation whereas in reality, many treated him as a hero. This signifies a departure from the blind
acceptance of government actions to a glorification of those who expose its misconduct for the
betterment of the nation (Prados and Porter 2004, 184). This trend is important because it still is
prevalent in modern society.
Historical Importance
The magnitude of New York Times v. U.S. in a historical context is almost immeasurable.
Foremost is the fact that this case serves as a major precedent for First Amendment case law and
is relied heavily upon when trying to determine the role of executive authority in regards to a
free press. The case is forever memorialized in history for its part in the political destruction of
President Nixon and the Watergate scandal, one of the most famous disgraces of the Executive
branch of all time.
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The Pentagon Papers case is also historically significant because of its function in ending
America’s role in the conflict in Vietnam. Had the Court ruled in favor of the government and
upheld their argument of prior restraint, certain governmental actions in Indochina would have
continued to be shielded from the public (Prados and Porter 2004, 193). Renowned historian
John Prados argues that had the government been able to still conceal certain events, the war
have continued on with no one the wiser (2004, 193). He cites the air attacks on North Vietnam
being carried out under the guise of “protective-reaction strikes,” as an example of this
phenomenon (Prados and Porter 2004, 193). Prados also asserts that the bombing of Cambodia
would have continued without the public’s knowledge if the Nixon administration were still able
to hide behind Executive authority (Prados and Porter 2004, 193-4). This applies to America’s
presence in Laos as well (Prados and Porter 2004, 193-4).
New York Times v. U.S. made extreme advances in the journalistic field (Prados and
Porter 2004, 188). Some of the issues that have stemmed from this sort of investigative
journalism demonstrates the danger inherent in complacency and the implications a priorrestraint regime would have (Prados and Porter 2004, 194). It also established a de facto
precedent for the public’s right to know and enabled the press to fulfill this demand, reinforcing
the stature of the press’ role in American society (Prados and Porter 2004, 188).
The Pentagon Papers in the 21st Century
Although New York Times v. U.S. was historically significant in a multitude of ways, it
did not lay to rest current and future controversy regarding governmental whistleblowing by any
means. Indeed, the United States has experienced a resurgence of this very issue in the recent
years, evidenced in the cases of WikiLeaks, Bradley Manning, and Edward Snowden.
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On July 25, 2010, WikiLeaks, an international online nonprofit organization, released an
avalanche of secret U.S. military intelligence and incident reports from the Afghanistan war
(Davidson 2011). Considered one of the largest leaks of classified data in U.S. history,
WikiLeaks gave three major publications—London’s Guardian newspaper, the New York Times,
and Der Spiegel in Germany—access to the files before circulating them online (Davidson
2011). This came two months after WikiLeaks disseminated a video entitled “Collateral
Murder,” which depicted a U.S. air attack that killed twelve civilians in Baghdad, along with
hundreds of thousands of additional military and diplomatic documents (including the Iraq War
Logs) (Davidson 2011). In keeping with their policy of protecting the anonymity of their sources,
WikiLeaks refused to divulge the identity of their informant (Davidson 2011). Despite this, it
was not long until the federal government discovered United States Army Soldier Private First
Class Bradley Manning, and identified him as the informant (Davidson 2011). Three years later,
on August 21, 2013, a military judge sentenced Pfc. Manning to 35 years in prison on counts of
violating the Espionage Act, copying and disseminating classified military field reports, State
Department cables, and assessments of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Tate 2013).
Supporters of WikiLeaks and Pfc. Manning are apt to draw parallels between this current
controversy and the Pentagon Papers case (Bellia 2012). However, prominent legal analysts
often argue that the lessons of the Pentagon Papers case are more complicated than might appear
at first glance (Bellia 2012). The Court’s per curiam decision masks areas of substantial
disagreement and shared assumptions among the Court’s members (Bellia 2012). Specifically,
the Pentagon Papers case reflects an institutional framework for “downstream disclosure of
leaked national security information, under which publishers within the reach of U.S. law would
weigh the potential harms and benefits of disclosure against the backdrop of potential criminal
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penalties and recognized journalistic norms,” (Bellia 2012). The WikiLeaks disclosures
demonstrate the instability of this framework by exposing new challenges for controlling the
downstream disclosure of leaked information and the corresponding likelihood of
“unintermediated” disclosure by an insider, as well as the risks of non-media intermediaries
attempting to curtail such revelations in response to government pressure or other outside forces
(Bellia 2012).
However, to Daniel Ellsberg it does not matter that the legal battles facing WikiLeaks
might be different from its predecessor New York Times v. U.S. (Fantz 2011). Ellsberg, the one
responsible for the leaking of the Pentagon Papers, has been extremely active and vocal in his
support of Pfc. Manning, even going so far as to say, “I was that young man; I was Bradley
Manning,” (Fantz 2011). Ellsberg relates to Manning’s dedication to the truth and justice,
acknowledging the fact that both swore that they would go to prison if it meant freeing the public
from the government’s deception (Fantz 2011). Indeed, Ellsberg is not the only one to draw
comparisons between the two; many view Manning as the modern day version of Ellsberg and
are therefore furious at the treatment he is subjected to (Fantz 2011). Despite this, analysts
believe that the reason why Manning’s situation is not accruing more media attention is due to
the rise of Edward Snowden (Tate 2013).
Snowden was a former CIA staffer who released bombshell revelations about vast
National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance because he said, “the public needs to decide
whether these programs and policies are right or wrong,” (Cohen 2013). Snowden’s supporters
similarly liken him to Ellsberg and brand him as a hero who acted in the interest of the greater
good (Cohen 2013). Ellsberg commented that “I think there has not been a more significant or
helpful leak or unauthorized disclosure in American history ever…and that definitely includes
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the Pentagon Papers,” (Cohen 2013). However, there exists a significant difference between
Ellsberg and Snowden (Cohen 2013).
The Pentagon Papers revealed that the government had intensified the war in Vietnam
and also lied to Congress and the public, transgressions that are clearly wrong (Cohen 2013). In
Snowden’s case though, it is unclear whether the NSA’s spying was actually legal and if
Snowden was motivated because he personally objected to how the government defends national
security (Cohen 2013). If the surveillance was legal, Snowden could potentially still appear as a
conscientious objector by breaking the law because of his own moral imperatives, but he might
not look like a whistle-blower anymore, subsequently distinguishing himself from Ellsberg
(Cohen 2013). It is also important to note that Ellsberg is widely regarded as a hero today
because history moved in his favor (Cohen 2013). Snowden’s whistle-blower status will be
reinforced if it appears that what the NSA has been doing is wrong (Cohen 2013). Society’s
verdict on Snowden will be dependant on if he got the balance right: “whether it turned out that
we were more at risk of becoming a surveillance state than we were of terrorism,” (Cohen 2013).
Conclusion
Arising out of increasing aggravation with the deception of the federal government, New
York Times v. U.S. rose to encompass society’s frustration with the war and swelled to a
magnitude no one could have imagined. When Ellsberg was debating whether or not to leak the
classified Pentagon Papers cataloguing the country’s involvement in Vietnam, he was not
thinking of striking a victory for the press or even making a name for himself. Instead, he
recognized how intrinsic knowledge is in combating tyranny and knew that it was the right of the
American people to know of the Executive branch’s lies. When challenged with prior restraint in
order to halt publication of the classified information, the New York Times and Washington Post
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fought back all the way to the Supreme Court. Luckily for the American people, the Court ruled
in favor of the press in declaring that the government had not demonstrated sufficient burden of
proof that releasing the information would debilitate national security. The six to three per
curiam opinion was short. Instead, six justices—including Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Marshall—filed concurring decisions, in some cases advocating for complete
freedom of the press to more limited roles for that institution. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Harlan and Blackmun filed separate dissents but Burger and Blackmun both joined Harlan’s
opinion. Harlan advocated that the case had been handled unwisely and feverishly and declared
the need of the Judicial branch to recognize the role of the Executive in the realm of international
diplomacy.
Despite serving as a key win for the First Amendment rights of the press, New York
Times v. U.S. had major implications. The Pentagon Papers were key in constructing the
downfall of President Nixon and his subsequent resignation from the Presidency and was the
driving force behind the formation of the White House Plumbers, the group that orchestrated one
of the most infamous political scandals. It also effectively changed the tide of the Vietnam War
by giving support to the anti-war movement, ultimately altering the course of events. Socially,
the Pentagon Papers contributed to the credibility gap and modified the relationship between the
press and the federal government. The case is historically significant because it is one of the
most famous freedom of press cases, ruined the career of one of the most illustrious figures in
political history, and established a de facto precedent.
New York Times v. U.S. is also extremely relevant in modern society with the increasing
prevalence of government whistleblowers, such as WikiLeaks, Pfc. Manning, and Edward
Snowden. The Pentagon Papers controversy demonstrates a similar parallel in which to evaluate
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these major events, even if the situations are not entirely the same. In understanding the full
meaning and implications of the case, it is important to remember Justice Black’s quote from the
decision:
Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role
in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The
Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain
forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government.
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